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 Abstract: We consider the collective model of labor supply with marketable domestic 
production (Chiappori, 1997). We first show that, if domestic production is mistakenly 
ignored by the economist, welfare analyses will be probably distorted. Precisely, the 
identification of “collective” indirect utilities will be generally biased. The direction and 
the size of the bias depend on the complementarity/substituability of spouses’ time 
inputs in the production process. The identification is unbiased if and only if the 
production function is additive. We then show that, even if domestic labor supplies 
are not observed by the economist, (i) market labor supplies have to satisfy testable 
restrictions, (ii) the structure of the model is partially identifiable so that valid welfare 
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The collective model of labor supply, developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992),
is by now a standard tool for analyzing household behavior and its empirical
success for the last ten years is considerable. Speciﬁcally, the possibility of
identifying the intrahousehold sharing of income from the sole observation of
labor supplies has turned out to be very attractive. This permits to perform
welfare comparisons at the individual level, instead of exclusively concentrat-
ing on the distribution of well-being across households as it is generally made
with traditional models.
The empirical study presented by Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2001)
is very representative of the potentiality of the collective approach. These
authors estimate a simple model of household labor supply with a sample of
couples extracted from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. They then ob-
serve that a one dollar increase in household non-labor income will increase
the wife’s share of income by 70 cents and the husband’s by 30 cents. They
also remark that divorce legislations and the state of the marriage market
aﬀect the intrahousehold distribution of income. The relevance of these re-
sults for economic policies that aim at targeting a particular person in the
household is clear. Lise and Seitz (2004) go even farther and use a collective
model of labor supply to investigate recent changes in the distribution of re-
sources in the United-Kingdom. They conclude that the rise in consumption
inequality over time at the household level may overstate the degree of con-
sumption inequality at the individual level by 40% between the late 1960s
and the present.1
One of the most serious criticisms of the collective model of labor supply,
however, concerns the treatment of domestic production. In the simplest
form of this model, non-market time coincides with pure leisure and home-
work is ignored. Thus, a low level of market labor supply is automatically
interpreted as a large consumption of leisure, whereas it may in fact reﬂect
the specialization of one of the members in home production. Apps and
Rees (1997) naturally conclude – even if it is not formally demonstrated
in their paper – that the presence of homework may signiﬁcantly distort
welfare analyses that are based on Chiappori’s initial identiﬁcation results.
Similar criticisms of the collective model are made by feminist economists;
1Other empirical applications of the collective model of labor supply for various coun-
tries include Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Moreau and Donni (2002), Blundell, Chiappori,
Magnac and Meghir (2004), Clark, Couprie and Sofer (2004), Vermeulen (2004).
2see Grossbard-Schechtman (2000) for instance.
This problem is tackled by Chiappori (1997) who considers a collective
model of domestic and market labor supplies. The household consists of
a couple without children. Each spouse is characterized by egoistic prefer-
ences and, as usual, the decision process results in Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes.
There are two (private) consumption goods: a market good, like in the simple
model of labor supply, and a domestic good which can be produced within
the household from a technology using time input. The latter can be con-
sumed by household members or exchanged on a market at a constant price.2
Chiappori then shows that, if domestic and market labor supplies are both
observed, the spouses’ preferences and the outcome of the decision process
can be completely identiﬁed (except for a constant). In addition, testable
restrictions on market and domestic labor supplies can be derived.3
In spite of this important theoretical contribution, empirical applications
of collective models accounting for home production are surprisingly rare.4
The most probable reason for that is that these models are very demanding in
terms of data and turn out to be diﬃcult to estimate. Time use surveys, even
if they are quite broadly available, are generally fragmented and unreliable
about wages and incomes. In this case, the main question is to determine
what the economist can say about the internal decision process without in-
formation on spouses’ homework. This is our objective in this paper. To
do that, we adopt Chiappori’s (1997) framework with marketable domestic
production and make the following contributions.
Firstly, we establish the general conditions on preferences and technolo-
gies under which household market labor supplies fulﬁll the restrictions de-
rived from Chiappori’s (1988, 1992) original framework. If these conditions
are satisﬁed, the economist is not able to empirically reject the simple model
labor supply in favor of a more sophisticated model that incorporates domes-
tic production. That is to say, the ‘structure’ that rationalizes the ‘observ-
2Apps and Rees (1988, 1997) and Chiappori (1997) also consider the case of a non-
marketable domestic good. In that case, the price of this good is endogenously determined
within the household. Identiﬁcation raises further diﬃculties, though.
3Other theoretical generalizations of the collective model of labor supply are given by
Fong and Zhang (2000), Donni (2003), Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir (2004).
4Apps and Rees (1996) and Aronsson, Daunfeldt, Wikstrom (2001) are probably the
most notable exceptions. These empirical investigations are directly based upon Apps
and Rees’s (1997) and Chiappori’s (1997) set-up. Couprie (2004) estimates a model of
domestic and market labor supplies but she supposes that spouses produce a public good
(instead of a private one). The strategy of identiﬁcation is then completely diﬀerent.
3able’ model is not unique. And, if the economist mistakenly ignores domestic
production, she may well draw wrong conclusions about the welfare impact
of economic policy.
Secondly, we examine this very case, in which there exist two equivalent
structures (depending on the omission of domestic production), and show to
what extent welfare analyses can be biased. Our result indicates that welfare
analyses are unbiased if and only if the proﬁt function is additive. Otherwise,
for the non-additive case, the size and the direction of the bias is function of
the complementarity/substitutability of spouses’ time inputs in the produc-
tion process. If leisure is a superior good – an uncontroversial assumption
– and if spouses’ labor are substitutes (resp. complements), the direct-eﬀect
of wage on spouses’ welfare is underestimated (resp. overestimated) and the
cross-eﬀect is overestimated (resp. underestimated). This result is illustrated
by an application to the estimations given by Chiappori et alii (2001).
Thirdly, we prove that, even if domestic labor supplies are not observed by
the economist, (i) market labor supplies have to satisfy testable restrictions
under the form of partial diﬀerential equations, and (ii) the most important
components of the decision process can be identiﬁed so that valid welfare
comparisons are still possible. To be precise, we show that the ‘collective’
indirect utilities, which are generally suﬃcient to perform welfare analyses,
can be recovered (up to composition by an increasing transform).5 Quite
importantly, the system of partial diﬀerential equations that deﬁnes these
utilities in the domestic production context generalizes Chiappori’s (1992)
system in that the solution of the former reduces to the solution of the
latter if the proﬁt function is additive. Since this result does not require
more data than what is necessary for estimating a simple collective model of
labor supply, we ﬁnally advocate a new, more general strategy for performing
welfare comparisons with collective models.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the collective model of
labor supply with marketable domestic production is described. In Section 3,
the implications of the omission domestic production are discussed. In par-
ticular, the form of preferences and technologies that generates non-unique
structures is completely characterized. In Section 4, the new identiﬁcation
results, valid in presence of domestic production, are given. In Section 5, a
conclusion and a summary are presented.
5Collective indirect utilities measure the level of welfare that individuals actually attain
in the household when facing a given set of wages, incomes and other variables.
42T h e m o d e l
The model is similar to Chiappori’s (1997) and our description will be very
brief. We consider a two-person household, consisting of a wife (f) and a hus-
band (m), which makes decisions about market and domestic labor supplies.6
Spouse i’s domestic and market labor supplies are respectively denoted by ti
and hi (i = f,m). Each spouse is characterized by speciﬁcp r e f e r e n c e sw h i c h
can be represented by utilities with usual regularity properties:
ui(T − Li,C i,Z i), (1)
where Li = ti+hi, Ci and Zi respectively denote spouse i’s total labor supply,
her/his consumption of an aggregate marketable good and her/his consump-
tion of an aggregate domestic good and T denotes the total endowment in
time. The domestic good is produced with the following technology:
Z = φ(tf,t m),
where φ is a strictly concave function. The domestic good can be bought and
sold on the market at a constant price.7 In consequence, we generally have:
Z 6= Zf + Zm. We consider the case of cross-sectional data so that the price
of both goods can be normalized to one. Spouse i’s market wage is denoted
by wi and household income by y.
Following the basic idea of the collective approach, we assume that the
decision process, whatever its true nature, always generates Pareto-eﬃcient
outcomes. There is one distribution factor, i.e., one exogenous variable that
inﬂuences the decision process without aﬀecting preferences or the budget
constraint, denoted by s (the extension to several distribution factors is triv-
ial). From the Theorems of Welfare Economics, the allocation problem can
be decentralized. In a ﬁrst step, spouses determine domestic labor supply in
order to maximize proﬁt:
π(wf,w m)=m a x
tf,tm
{φ(tf,t m) − wftf − wmtm},
6The couple is not necessarily married. The terminology is just for convenience.
7This assumption is introduced by Gronau (1977) who regards “work at home as a time
use that generates services which have a close substitute in the market, while leisure has
only poor market substitutes”. See Chiappori (1997) for a discussion of its relevance.
5where π(wf,w m) is a normalized proﬁt function. This function is assumed to
be three times continuously diﬀerentiable. Then, from the Hotelling Lemma,





and satisfy a symmetry condition. In a second step, spouses agree on a
sharing of total income, deﬁned by
ψ = y + π(wf,w m).
Each spouse i then receives a share ρi,w i t h
P
k ρk = ψ, and independently
maximizes her/his utility subject to a personal budget constraint:
max
Li,Ci,Zi
ui(T − Li,C i,Z i) (2)
subject to
Ci + Zi − wiLi = ρi(wf,w m,y,s).
In other words, the function ρi can be seen as the natural generalization of
the sharing rule in the case of household production. Total labor supplies




k ρk = ψ.N o t et h a tLi and ρi are assumed to be twice continuously
diﬀerentiable. Combining these expressions yields market labor supplies:
hi = Li(wi,ρi) − ti(wf,w m). (3)
In what follows, we assume that only the market labor supplies are observed
by the economist.
W eh a v et oi n t r o d u c ea n o t h e rc o n c e p tt h a tt u r n so u tt ob eu s e f u li n
welfare analysis. Since the price of both aggregate goods is normalized to one,
the indirect utilities that correspond to (1) can be written as vi(wi,Tw i+ρi).




i(wf,w m,y,s)=vi(wi,Tw i + ρi(wf,w m,y,s)). (4)
This expression describes the level of welfare that spouse i attains in the
household when she/he faces a wage-income bundle (wf,w m,y) and a dis-
tribution factor s. The function v∗
i is generally more convenient than vi for
making welfare comparisons because it directly gives the actual change in
welfare due to a modiﬁcation in the household environment.
63A ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h ep r o b l e m
3.1 Deﬁnition and characterization
We know that, if there is domestic production, the form of market labor
supplies is described by (3). In principle, the economist will not make mis-
takes in performing welfare analysis since the theoretical restrictions listed
by Chiappori (1988, 1992) for the simple model of labor supply have not
to be satisﬁed in a more general context. Hence, if domestic production is
mistakenly ignored, the collective approach will be almost always ‘rejected’.
This assertion has, however, to be nuanced in practice since data are neces-
sarily imperfect and statistical tests are often misleading. We thus consider a
particular class of ‘observable’ market labor supplies that, in spite of domes-
tic production, can be confused with those resulting from Chiappori’s (1988,
1 9 9 2 )o r i g i n a lf r a m e w o r ka n dw ei n v e s t i g a t et h en a t u r eo ft h eb i a st h a tc a n
be made in welfare analysis. This class O (say) is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 Suppose that there is marketable domestic production. A sys-
tem of observable market labor supplies belongs to class O if and only if
there exist some twice continuously diﬀerentiable functions gi and ϕi,w i t h P
k ϕk = y, such that market labor supplies can be written as: hi = gi(wi,ϕi).
In this deﬁnition, the relation hi = gi(wi,ϕi) describes the structure
that characterizes market labor supplies in absence of domestic production.
Hence, if the system of ‘observed’ market labor supplies belongs to class O,
the underlying structure is not uniquely deﬁned. To be more explicit, let us
consider the following identity:
Li(wi,ρi) − ti(wf,w m)=gi(wi,ϕi). (5)
The ‘true’ structure that accounts for domestic production is in the left-
hand-side and the ‘false’ structure that ignores domestic production in the
right-hand-side. In this case, the economist is not able to empirically reject
the simple model of labor supply in favor of a model with domestic produc-
tion. And, if the economist mistakenly assumes that there is no domestic
production, she may well draw wrong conclusions about the intrahousehold
distribution of resources. The consequences of this possible misinterpretation
have thus to be carefully examined. The ﬁrst step is to (almost) completely
determine the form of preferences and technologies such that market labor
7supplies belong to class O, i.e., such that the condition described by (5) is
satisﬁe d .T h i si st h er o l eo ft h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o n s .
Proposition 2 A system of observable market labor supplies belongs to class
O if the proﬁt function is additive, i.e., if there exist some functions πi such
that π = πf(wf)+πm(wm).
Proof If the proﬁt function is additive, then Li(wi,ρi)−ti(wi)=gi(wi,ϕi),
with
P
i ρi = y+
P
i πi(wi).W et h e nd e ﬁne ϕi = ρi−πi(wi) and gi(wi,ϕi)=
Li(wi,πi(wi)+ϕi) − ti(wi).k
In words, this proposition states that, whatever the form of spouses’ pref-
erences or the sharing rule, the assumption that spouses’ inputs are indepen-
dent in the production process is suﬃcient for market labor supplies to satisfy
the conditions listed in Chiappori (1988, 1992). In addition, we may remark
that the additivity of the proﬁt function is directly implied by the additivity
of the production function, i.e.,
φ(tf,t m)=φf(tf)+φm(tm).
Then, a simple consequence is that, if the production function is additive, a
test of the collective approach can be implemented without taking account
of spouses’ homework. We will see below that the additivity assumption has
other attractive implications.
The next proposition considers a more general family of production tech-
nologies and completes the characterization of class O.I n t h i s c a s e ,E n g e l
curves have to be linear. A regularity condition is necessary.
Condition R Preferences and the sharing of income are such that ∂Li/∂ρi
6=0and ∂ρi/∂s 6=0for any (ρi,s) in R2.
Proposition 3 Suppose that (i) the proﬁt function is non-additive and (ii)
R is satisﬁed. Then, a system of observable market labor supplies belongs to
class O i fa n do n l yi ft h e r ee x i s ts o m ef u n c t i o n sαi, βi, γi and G such that














8The proof of this proposition is postponed until the end of this section
since it requires the results that follow. We may note a this stage that
the linearity of the Engel curves has well-known implications in terms of
preferences. Gorman (1961) shows that, in this case, the indirect utilities
have to be of the form:












where αi and βi are deﬁn e da si nP r o p o s i t i o n3 ;s e ea l s oP o l l a ka n dW a l e s
(1992, p. 27). Then, it is easily shown that applying the Roy Identity to
(6) gives leisure demands. This assumption may seem a priori restrictive
but, in fact, many empirical studies estimate functional forms that are linear
in income. Speciﬁcally, we will see below that Chiappori et alii’s (2001)
functional form has this property. The linearity may be regarded as a good
approximation in many circumstances.
3.2 Identifying the wrong model
In this preliminary step, we suppose that the system of observed market labor
supplies belong to class O so that a misinterpretation of the reduced-form
estimates by the economist cannot be dismissed a priori. We also suppose
that condition R is satisﬁed. The reasoning then follows in three stages.
1. If we diﬀerentiate (5) with respect to y and s, and solve the resulting




















92. If we diﬀerentiate (5) with respect to wj (j = f,m and j 6= i),u s e( 7 )















represents an error in the estimated derivative of the sharing rule.
3. If we diﬀerentiate the adding up restriction
P
k ϕk = y with respect to







Now, we diﬀerentiate the adding up restriction
P
k ρk = ψ = π + y with













+( ti + νj). (11)
Welfare distortions. The eﬀect of the husband’s (say) wage on his own
share of income cannot be directly interpreted in terms of welfare variations.
To infer the distortions that may result from ignoring homework, we have to
u s e( 4 ) .I fw ed i ﬀerentiate this expression with respect to wj (j 6= i), y and























where λi = ∂vi/∂ρi is the marginal utility of money. This indicates that the
impact of these variables on spouse i’s welfare coincides with the derivatives
10of the sharing rule up to a multiplicative term. Moreover, if we diﬀerentiate











We can now describe the distortions in welfare analysis that the omission of
domestic production implies. To do that, let us deﬁne ˆ v∗
i as the collective
indirect utility that is obtained from the relations: hi = gi(wi,ϕi).T h a t
is, the collective indirect utility that is mistakenly retrieved if the economist
ignores domestic production.
Proposition 4 Suppose that R is satisﬁed. If the system of observed market

































where µi and ηi are positive functions.
Proof Let µi = λi/ˆ λi, where ˆ λi is the marginal utility of money for the
model without domestic production, be the price of utility ˆ v∗
i in terms of
utility v∗
i and ηi = λi be the price of money in terms of utility v∗
i.T h e n ,t h e
proof straightforwardly results from (8) to (13) and the system of equations
which deﬁnes collective indirect utilities in Chiappori (1992, p. 451).k
In words, the eﬀect of non-labor income and distribution factors on wel-
fare is correctly estimated by the simple model of labor supply. However, the
eﬀect of wages is generally biased and depends on the function νi.M o r ep r e -
cisely, the bias resulting from the omission of domestic production is related
to the substitutability/complementarity relationship between spouses’ time
inputs in the production process. If leisure is a superior good – an uncon-
troversial assumption – and if spouses’ labor are substitutes (resp. comple-
ments), and consequently νi < 0 (resp. νi > 0), the direct-eﬀect of wage on
11spouses’ welfare is underestimated (resp. overestimated) and the cross-eﬀect
is overestimated (resp. underestimated). We also have the very important
corollary that follows.
Corollary 5 The omission of domestic production does not invalidate wel-
fare comparisons if and only if the proﬁt function is additive.
This corollary speciﬁes the conditions that the underlying production
function has to satisfy to make valid welfare comparisons with Chiappori’s
(1988, 1992) initial model.8 The empirical relevance of this condition is exam-
ined in the next subsection. Before that, we may consider another interesting
application of this corollary. So, if for unspeciﬁed reasons the husband’s (say)
domestic labor supply is perfectly inelastic – this extreme situation certainly
represents a convenient approximation for many households in which the hus-
band does not participate to household chores – the welfare comparisons
obtained from the simplest form of the collective model are still valid.9
3.3 A numerical example
The complementarity/substitutability relationship between spouses’ time is
clearly an empirical issue. What can be learned from data? Consider an
activity which is valued primarily for its output rather than its inherent sat-
isfaction – it excludes child caring that, broadly speaking, can be assimilated
to leisure. Research then shows that “relative wages of the couple appear to
matter some, but that much of the division of labor is independent of wages”
(Juster and Staﬀord, 1991, p. 498). In other words, the number of hours
worked at home are not very ﬂexible to variations in wages. Having said
that, the hypothesis of substitutability is generally supported by empirical
studies in the United-States but conclusive evidence is deﬁnitely lacking. In
one of these rare investigations, based on the IXth wave of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, Graham and Green (1984) show that the own-wage elas-
ticity of the wife’s domestic labor supply is equal to −0.169 (t-test =3 .593)
8Of course, the direct utilities ˆ ui which are recovered from the relations: hi = gi(wi,ϕi)
cannot be interpreted in the usual way, even if the production function is additive. They
are a mixture of individual preferences ui and individual technologies πi.
9In a certain sense, the implications of the assumptions of the model are overall correct
although these assumptions are inaccurate. This is a reminiscence of the instrumentalist
view of economics by Friedman (1953).
12and the cross-wage elasticity to 0.047 (t-test =0 .888). Hill and Juster (1985)
draw a similar conclusion with time use data and a disagregate framework.
See also Gronau (1977) for more results on the United-States.10
The previous subsection shows that the distortions in welfare analysis are
small if domestic labor supplies are relatively insensitive to partner’s wage.
On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that the cross-elasticities of
domestic labor supplies are close to zero. Should we necessarily conclude
that the simple model of labor supply is suﬃc i e n tt om a k ep r e c i s ew e l f a r e
analysis? Actually, the answer is no. As a matter-of-fact, the size of the bias
also depends on the sensitivity of leisure demands. And empirical evidence
unambiguously suggests that the impact of income shares on leisure demands
is very small. Consequently, the bias in welfare analysis may be, at the end,
substantial. The numerical example that follows illustrates this point.
A consequence of what precedes is that any functional form for market
labor supplies that satisﬁes the theoretical restrictions listed in Chiappori
(1988, 1992) and implies a linear form such as hi = gi(wi,ϕi) is also com-
patible with a more sophisticated model accounting for non-additive proﬁt
functions. Let us consider for example Chiappori et alii’s (2001) functional
form for market labor supplies:
hi = ai + bi lnwf + ci lnwm + di lnwf lnwm + eiy + difs, (14)
where ai,...,e i and f are parameters. This form has linear Engel curves and
the slopes αf and αm are constants, uniquely deﬁned by
αf = ef −
df
dm




In contrast with Chiappori et alii (2001), however, we suppose that there is
domestic production. For example, the underlying proﬁtf u n c t i o nm a yh a v e
the following form:













10However, the most natural application of the model of marketable domestic production
concerns agricultural households. It appears that, in this case, the impact of wages on
domestic labor supplies is more important. See Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) and
Taylor and Adelman (2004) for surveys.
13where κ0,κi,κii and λ are parameters. In this case, the conditions of Propo-
sition 3 are satisﬁed. From the Hotelling Lemma, the domestic labor supplies
that are compatible with (15) are:
ti = κi + κiiwi + αiλ × exp(αfwf + αmwm)
−1 . (16)
Then, symmetry is fulﬁlled and the market labor supplies can be written
under the form described by (14).
In what follows, we use the empirical results given by Chiappori et alii
(2001) and evaluate the amplitude of the distortions due to the omission of
domestic production. The dependent variable is measured by the number of
worked hours per year. Firstly, Chiappori et alii (2001, Tables 2 & 4) show
that a one-thousand-dollar increase in the yearly wife’s (resp. husband’s)
share of income implies, on average, a decrease in market labor supply by
about 10 hours (resp. 20 hours) over the year. That is, αf ' 0.01 and
αm ' 0.02. Secondly, a reasonable and prudent conjecture, based on elas-
ticities that can be found in the literature, is that a one-dollar increase in
t h ew i f e ’ s( r e s p .h u s b a n d ’ s )h o u r l yw a g ei m p l i e sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eh u s b a n d ’ s
(resp. wife’s) domestic labor supply by about 5 hours.11 This is, of course, a
rough approximation. Hence, νf ' 500 and νm ' 250. Let us consider now
the wife’s welfare. From Chiappori et alii (2001, Table 4), we obtain:12
∂ˆ v
∗
f/∂wf ' 107 × ˆ λf,
∂ˆ v
∗
f/∂wm ' 600 × ˆ λf.
The striking point is that the eﬀect of the wife’s wage on her welfare is




f/∂wf ' (107 + νm) × λf =3 5 7× λf,
∂v
∗
f/∂wm ' (600 − νf) × λf = 100 × λf.
The wife’s welfare is now more sensitive to variations in her own wage than to
v a r i a t i o n si nh e rp a r t n e r ’ sw a g e .T h i si sm o r ei nl i n ew i t hi n t u i t i o n .H o w e v e r ,
11This ﬁgure corresponds to an elasticity of 0.05 for a wage equal to $10 and a number
of homeworked hours equal to 1000.
12The second line is directly computed from the estimates of the derivatives of the
sharing rule at the average point of the sample (600). The ﬁrst line uses the estimates of
the derivatives of the sharing rule (−1634) and the average number of hours worked by
women on market (1741). Then, 107 = 1741 − 1634. It is fair to say, however, that the
standard deviations for these estimates are quite large.
14the conclusion of this example is that, even if domestic labor supplies are
quite inelastic, the distortions in welfare comparisons may be important.
3.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Let us go back to the proof of Proposition 3. The reader who desires avoiding
technicalities may skip this subsection. The proof follows in two steps.
a) (First Necessary Condition) The ﬁrst step is to show that, under
condition R, Engel curves have to be linear. To do that, we diﬀerentiate (5)





























The term in parentheses in the right-hand-side is diﬀerent from zero because
of the non-additivity of the proﬁtf u n c t i o n( a n dt h u sνi 6=0 ). Then, if
∂ρi/∂s 6=0 , Engel curves are linear: ∂2Li/∂ρ2
i =0 . The linearity is thus a
ﬁrst necessary condition in the non-additive case.
b) (Second Necessary Condition) Then, we have to prove that the
speciﬁcf o r mf o rt h ep r o ﬁt function given in Proposition 3 is also necessary.
If Engel curves are linear, (5) becomes:
αi(wi)ρi + βi(wi) − ti(wf,w m)=αi(wi)ϕi + ξi(wi),










15since αi(wi) 6=0by condition R. We sum up (17) for each spouse and use










i δ(wi)=0 . (18)
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ep r o ﬁt function can be seen as a solution to this partial
diﬀerential equation is a second necessary condition. The explicit solution of
this type of equation is given in Lemma 7 in the appendix.
Since this partial diﬀerential equation has always a solution, from well-
known theorems in partial diﬀerential equation theory, the two necessary
conditions are suﬃcient as well.k
4 A new identiﬁcation result
4.1 Result and interpretation
One of the main results presented in the previous section is that a welfare
analysis based on a theoretical framework that ignores home production is
valid if and only if the proﬁt function is additive. The properties of the
proﬁt function is an empirical issue and the economist should leave it to the
facts. Still evidence is not clear-cut. Moreover, we show in our numerical
illustration that even small deviations from additivity may largely distort
welfare conclusions. In this case, the main question is: How can we make
welfare analysis without observing domestic labor supplies or making strong
assumptions on the proﬁt function?
This important issue is addressed in the present section. Precisely, we
show that the most important components of the model can be retrieved
from the sole observation of market labor supplies. Hence, making welfare
analysis is possible without observing domestic labor supplies. To do that,











with i,j = f,m and j 6= i,
where denominator is supposed to be diﬀerent from zero, and the following
regularity condition.
16Condition R0 Market labor supplies are such that ∂hi/∂s 6=0 , ∆i 6=0 ,
∂∆i/∂y 6=0for almost all (wf,w m,y,s) in R2
+ × R2.
The main result is then formally stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose collective rationality with marketable domestic pro-
duction. Market labor supplies are observed. Then, if R0 is satisﬁed,
1. Market labor supplies have to satisfy testable constraints under the form
of partial diﬀerential equations;
2 .T h ei n c o m es h a r ea n dt h ed o m e s t i cl a b o rs u p p l yo fs p o u s ef (resp. m)
can be identiﬁed up to an additive function of wf (resp. wm);
3. The indirect collective utility of both spouses can be identiﬁed up to
composition by an increasing transform.
Before demonstrating this proposition in the next subsection, we have to
make several remarks.
1. The second statement can be interpreted as follows. If ρ∗
i(wf,w m,y,s)
is a particular solution for the spouse i’ ss h a r et h a ti sc o m p a t i b l ew i t hb o t h





for some unknown function ki(wi). The interpretation is similar for the third
statement (identiﬁcation of domestic labor supplies). Let us note that, if
both domestic labor supplies were observed, the indeterminacy in income
shares would consist merely of a constant, instead of a function.
2. The identiﬁcation of income shares is thus incomplete. However, since
the functions v∗
i(wf,w m,y,s) – i.e., the most useful concept to make welfare
comparisons – are identiﬁable up to composition by an increasing transform,
it is possible to make policy recommendations in almost all circumstances.
173. Condition R0 is quite complicated. This condition excludes (i) Marshal-
lian labor supplies that are linear functions of spouses’ share and (ii) spouses’
shares of income that are linear functions of non-labor income.13 Thus, the
functional form used by Chiappori et alii (2001) does not allow to perform
welfare analysis. Our numerical example is thus necessary to evaluate the
bias resulting from the omission of domestic production.
4. The deﬁnitions of the derivatives of the indirect collective utilities with
respect to non-labor income or distribution factors are exactly the same as
Chiappori’s (1992) ones. The deﬁnitions of the derivatives of the collective
indirect utilities with respect to wages diﬀer but they reduce to Chiappori’s
deﬁnitions if the proﬁt function is additive. Our identiﬁcation result is thus a
generalization of what is perhaps the most famous result on collective models.
5. Our recommended strategy is thus the following. To begin with, if she
does not have prior information on the underlying domestic technology, the
economist should use the general model which allows for domestic produc-
tion. Then, a statistical test of the validity of the additivity hypothesis
can be performed since the cross-derivatives of domestic labor supplies are
identiﬁable. Only if the additivity hypothesis is not rejected by the data,
the economist is allowed to use the simplest formulae to retrieve collective
indirect utilities when she performs welfare analysis.
4.2 Proof of Proposition 6
P r o o fo fS t a t e m e n t s1a n d2 . If we diﬀerentiate (3) with respect to y

















with ∂ρf/∂y + ∂ρm/∂y =1and ∂ρf/∂s + ∂ρm/∂s =0 . Chiappori et alii
(2001) shows that, if R is satisﬁed, this system can be solved with respect
13Unsurprisingly, condition R0 is related to the conditions on preferences and technolo-
gies listed in Propositions 2 and 3: if the underlying structure is not uniquely deﬁned, it
is obvious that some identiﬁcation problems –harmless or serious – appear. Condition
R0 is also related to Condition R.
18to the derivatives of the sharing rule and total labor supplies. Using the




























for i = f,m.













































































for i,j = f,m and j 6= i.






















































































Since the partial derivatives are deﬁned up to a multiplicative function λi,
the collective indirect utilities are deﬁned up to composition by an increasing
transform.k
5 Summary and conclusion
The present paper can be regarded as a toolbox for applied economists who
are interested in performing welfare comparisons at the individual level. A
synthesis of our main conclusions may be useful at this stage. Let us consider
a sample of couples and assume there is domestic production. Then,
1. A simple model of market labor supplies, which does not allow for
domestic production, may conveniently ﬁt the data if and only if (i)
the proﬁt function is additive or (ii) Engel curves are linear and the
proﬁt function has a particular, not necessarily additive form.
2 .I f( i )o r( i i )i ss a t i s ﬁed, then the economist is not able to empirically
reject the simple model of labor supply. Suppose the economist arbi-
trarily decides to ignore domestic production.
203. If (i) is satisﬁed, welfare analyses the economist makes are valid. If (ii)
is satisﬁed, welfare analyses are biased: if spouses’ labor are substitutes
(resp. complements), the direct-eﬀe c to fw a g eo ns p o u s e s ’w e l f a r ei su n -
derestimated (resp. overestimated) and the cross-eﬀect is overestimated
(resp. underestimated).
4. There exists a simple method for retrieving collective indirect utilities
that is robust to household production. This method necessitates the
observation of the sole market labor supplies, allows to make correct
welfare analysis and, if the proﬁt function is additive, reduces to the
traditional method.
To sum up, the main – and probably the most unexpected – result in
this paper is that the economist can get out of observing homework when
performing welfare comparisons at the individual level. This opens up new
horizons for empirical investigations. Quite importantly, our results cru-
cially depend on the assumption that domestic goods are marketable. Ad-
mittedly, the goods trade on outside market are likely imperfect substitutes
for goods produced within the household – except in agricultural house-
holds, for which domestic goods have a simple, natural interpretation. Our
argument is that the assumption of marketability is certainly less restrictive
than the straight exclusion of domestic production as in the simple collective
model of labor supply. Future researches should, however, investigate the
case of non-marketable domestic goods.
A Appendix – A Useful Lemma











+ c(x)+d(y)=0 , (24)
where functions a(x), b(y) are continuously diﬀerentiable in R and do not
vanish simultaneously at any point of R, and functions c(x), d(y) are contin-























Proof. The idea of the proof is well-known in the theory of partial diﬀer-
ential equations (see Zachmanoglou and Thoe, 1976, for instance). It follows
in stages. We consider the solution of the homogenous partial diﬀerential












and use a particular solution of (24) to solve the non-homogenous case.
Homogenous case. We have to introduce new coordinates, r and t,i n
terms of which (24) takes the form of an ordinary diﬀerential equation that
can be easily solved. Let the new coordinates be related to the old ones by the
equations: r = r(x,y) and t = t(x,y). We require that the functions r(x,y)













If this condition is satisﬁed at the point (x0,y 0),w ea l s oh a v ei nt h en e i g h b o r -
hood of (x0,y 0) the inverse relations: x = x(r,t) and y = y(r,t). Substituting











































This is the characteristic equation of the partial diﬀerential equation. There
are inﬁnitely many solutions. Supposing for example that a(x) 6=0 ,t h e







Then, for any change of variable such that this condition is satisﬁed, we have:
α =0 . The characteristic curves, which satisfy by deﬁnition this condition,
can be obtained by solving the diﬀerential equation:
b(y) · dy = a(x) · dx.
Thats is:
Z
b(y) · dy −
Z
a(x) · dx = k,




b(y) · dy −
Z
a(x) · dx.
It is easy to show that (25) is satisﬁed for this change of variable. The second
change of variable can be arbitrarily assigned such that Jpde 6=0 . We choose:
t = y.
Using this change of variable gives a simple ordinary diﬀerential equation in

































for some function G.
Non-homogenous case. T h es e c o n ds t e pi so b t a i nas o l u t i o ni nt h en o n -
homogeneous case. If we add a particular solution of the non-homogenous
partial diﬀerential equation to the general solution which is derived above,
we obtain the general solution of the non-homogeneous partial diﬀerential








This concludes the proof of the Lemma.k
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